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Abstract 
Imagery perspective can influence what information is recalled, processing style, and 
emotionality; however, the understanding of possible mechanisms mediating these observed 
differences is still limited. We aimed to examine differences between memory recall from a 
field perspective and observer perspective at the neurobiological level, in order to improve 
our understanding of what is underlying the observed differences at the behavioral level. We 
conducted a fMRI study in healthy individuals, comparing imagery perspectives during recall 
of neutral and positive autobiographical memories. Behavioral results revealed field 
perspective imagery of positive memories, as compared to observer perspective, to be 
associated with more positive feelings afterwards. At the neurobiological level, contrasting 
observer perspective to field perspective imagery was associated with greater activity, or less 
decrease relative to the control visual search task, in the right precuneus and in the right 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Greater activity in the right TPJ during an observer 
perspective as compared to field perspective could reflect performing a greater shift of 
perspective and mental state during observer perspective imagery than field perspective 
imagery. Differential activity in the precuneus may reflect that during observer perspective 
imagery individuals are more likely to engage in (self-) evaluative processing and visuospatial 
processing. Our findings contribute to a growing understanding of how imagery perspective 
can influence the type of information that is recalled and the intensity of the emotional 
response. Observer perspective imagery may not automatically reduce emotional intensity but 
this could depend on how the imagined situation is evaluated in relation to the self-concept. 
 
Keywords: mental imagery; imagery perspective; autobiographical memory; fMRI; 
temporoparietal junction; precuneus;   
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Mental imagery of positive and neutral memories: A fMRI study comparing field 
perspective imagery to observer perspective imagery 
1. Introduction 
When people think back of past events and experiences, they often report to have 
mental images related to the event. Mental imagery of autobiographical memories can have 
powerful emotional effects (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; 2010) and influence thoughts and 
behavior like present situations. Due to the strong link with emotion, mental imagery is 
therefore also used in psychotherapy, for example, in the form of imagery rescripting (Holmes 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the recall of positive 
autobiographical memories plays a role in the self-generation of positive emotions when faced 
with a stressful situation (Phillippe et al., 2009). In healthy participants, positive memory 
recall has been shown to be a successful emotional regulation strategy to improve mood after 
a negative mood induction (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann et al., 2007). This suggests 
that promoting imagery of positive emotional memories, possibly strengthening the emotional 
effects, may be interesting for applications of positive memory recall in emotion regulation. 
A distinction is made between imagery from a field perspective and imagery from an 
observer perspective, with individuals being able to experience more than one perspective 
when recalling events (Rice & Rubin, 2009). Field perspective is about imagining a situation 
such that “people re-experience the event through their own eyes, as if they were looking 
outward, perceiving the situation now much as they did before.” Observer perspective, on the 
other hand, is described as when people “take the perspective of an autonomous observer or 
spectator, so that they see themselves as actors in the remembered scene” (McIsaac & Eich, 
2002, p. 146). Imagery perspective can influence the information that is recalled about events 
and the intensity of the emotional response. Previous research has indicated that individuals 
imagining memories from a field perspective gave more statements concerning affective 
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reactions, physical sensations, and psychological states, whereas memories imagined from an 
observer perspective included more information concerning how the person looked, physical 
actions, or spatial relations (McIsaac & Eich, 2002). It has also been proposed that thinking 
about past events in terms of the experiences evoked by features of the event is related to a 
field perspective, as compared to thinking about the event in terms of its broader context or 
meaning in an individuals’ life which is related to an observer perspective (Libby & Eibach, 
2011). 
Imagery perspective is also believed to influence the emotional response. Field 
perspective imagery has been related to a greater emotional response than imagery from an 
observer perspective and/or verbal processing (Holmes et al., 2008; Holmes et al., 2009; 
Holmes et al., 2006) and individuals imagining memories from a field perspective perceive 
their memories as more emotional than individuals imagining memories from an observer 
perspective (McIsaac & Eich, 2002). Alternatively, it has been proposed that imagery 
perspective does not directly influences emotional impact, but that the differential effects of 
imagery perspective on emotional impact depend on whether considering the event in terms of 
its broader context or meaning in an individuals’ life (during observer perspective) decreases 
or increases the emotional power (Libby & Eibach, 2011).  
Research on mental imagery thus seems to indicate that imagery perspective can 
influence the type of information that is recalled and the intensity of the emotional response. 
Given that imagery of memories is often used in psychotherapy and has interesting 
possibilities for application in the self-generation of positive emotions and emotion 
regulation, it seems important to understand the underlying mechanisms of differences 
between imagery perspectives. However, our understanding of possible mechanisms 
mediating these observed differences between imagery perspectives is still limited. A possible 
explanation for the differences between imagery perspectives on emotional intensity has been 
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proposed based on studies comparing self-distancing to self-immersion when reflecting on 
emotional experiences. Self-immersion has been described as focusing on concrete features of 
the experience leading to a reliving of the experience, which could be compared to taking a 
field perspective. Self-distancing on the other hand, might reflect more abstract processing 
and has been described as working through experiences from an ego-decentered perspective 
which is more in line with adopting an observer perspective (Kross et al., 2005). It has been 
argued that self-distancing can facilitate more adaptive forms of self-reflection (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2011). Taking a self-distanced perspective on negative or stressful events has shown 
to decrease emotional intensity (Kross et al., 2005; Kross et al., 2014), and shortens emotion 
duration for negative but also for positive emotional experiences (Verduyn et al., 2012). A 
different explanation has been suggested in studies on the role of imagery perspective in 
depression, proposing that adopting an observer perspective could promote evaluative 
thinking about the self, which could result in unfavorable self-comparisons (with an ideal self) 
reducing the positive affective response (Kuyken & Howell, 2006; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). 
This seems also in line with the idea that an observer perspective is related to thinking about 
the recalled event in terms of its broader context or meaning in an individuals’ life, with the 
meaning of such events in relation to the self-concept becoming more salient, which as a 
result can either decrease or increase the emotional power (Libby & Eibach, 2011).  
Although behavioral research provides some suggestions on what might be underlying 
the observed differences depending on imagery perspectives, little is known about 
neurobiological differences between imagery perspectives in memory recall while this could 
complement knowledge from behavioral research. There are some functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies comparing visual perspectives, investigating whether a 
first-person perspective (i.e. field perspective) is related to a greater sense of ‘reliving’ a 
situation than a third-person perspective (i.e. observer perspective), but these studies mostly 
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used externally generated images (e.g. Jackson et al., 2006). When participants were shown 
video clips of hand and foot actions, either from a first-person- or a third-person perspective, 
more activity was shown in the left sensory-motor cortex when viewing the video clips from a 
first-person perspective compared to a third-person perspective, which is in line with the idea 
of a greater sense of ‘reliving’ in field perspective imagery (Jackson et al., 2006). However, 
such studies investigating the difference between visual perspectives (Jackson et al., 2006; 
Ruby & Decety, 2001) often use externally generated pictures or video fragments of physical 
actions and tend to confound imagery perspective with the identity of the actor of the physical 
action (i.e. imagining the self versus another person doing an action). During a study in which 
participants mentally imagined doing actions with objects, greater activity was observed in the 
posterior cingulate cortex, right precuneus, inferior parietal lobule, and frontopolar gyrus 
during a third-person perspective when contrasted to a first-person perspective (Ruby & 
Decety, 2001). Although this study differs from our design on some important aspects (e.g. 
confounding third person perspective with the identity of the actor), it can still be indicative of 
brain areas involved when one is taking a more distanced perspective (third person) as 
compared to imagining being more actively engaged in a situation (first person), which is an 
important difference between the visual perspectives.   
To our knowledge there is only one study so far that directly investigated the neural 
systems mediating field and observer perspective when imagining memories (Eich et al., 
2009). In this study participants performed four tasks, which during a second-session a week 
later were to be recalled in the scanner (Eich et al., 2009). Three regions were found to show 
greater activity during field perspective imagery when directly compared to observer 
perspective imagery. During field memories increased activity was observed in the right 
posterior amygdala, bilateral insula, and in left motor and somatosensory areas (Eich et al., 
2009). These results, combined with behavioral results of this study showing that field 
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memories were related to greater subjective emotionality, are consistent with studies 
associating subjective emotionality of autobiographical memories to the amygdala (Cabeza & 
St. Jacques, 2007). Furthermore, both the insula and somatosensory areas have been 
previously linked to interoceptive awareness of one’s feelings (e.g. Critchley et al., 2004; 
Pollatos et al., 2006) corresponding to the idea that adopting a field perspective as compared 
to an observer perspective is related to increased affective monitoring (Eich et al. 2009).  
In the current study we aimed to extend our knowledge on differences in neural areas 
mediating field and observer memories, using fMRI, in order to improve our understanding of 
what might explain the observed differences between imagery perspectives on subjective 
emotionality. Eich et al. (2009) used memory recall of tasks that were performed as part of the 
experiment and aimed to represent everyday life situations. However, our goal was to 
compare a field and observer perspective when imagining self-generated memories for both 
neutral and positive emotional events, reflecting better how mental imagery could be applied 
to memory recall in the context of self-generation of positive emotions and emotion 
regulation. 
 We first aimed to identify the brain areas showing increases in the blood-oxygenation 
level dependent (BOLD) signal during recall of both positive and neutral memories from a 
field and observer perspective relative to the same control task, a visual search task, as Eich et 
al. (2009). We hypothesized that for both perspectives in neutral and positive memories, we 
would observe activity in prefrontal and medial temporal cortices, temporal-parietal areas, and 
the precuneus, in line with Eich et al. (2009) and previous research on autobiographical 
memory recall (for reviews, see Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Svoboda et al., 2006). Secondly, 
we directly contrasted field perspective imagery to observer perspective imagery regardless of 
type of memory (i.e. neutral and positive collapsed). We expected greater activity in the 
amygdala, insula, and motor and somatosensory areas during field perspective imagery when 
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directly contrasted to observer perspective imagery, which would fit the idea that field 
perspective imagery is related to a greater sense of ‘reliving’ and subjective emotionality (see 
also Eich et al., 2009). Additionally we hypothesized that the posterior cingulate cortex/ 
precuneus would show greater activity during observer perspective imagery as compared to 
field perspective imagery. Previous studies have shown activity in these areas when taking a 
third-person perspective, as compared to a first-person perspective, during imagery of actions 
with objects (Ruby & Decety, 2001) and when describing reactions to both neutral and social 
emotional situations (Ruby & Decety, 2004). The precuneus has also shown to be active when 
comparing being an observer of social interaction as contrasted to being personally involved 
in the social interaction (Schilbach et al., 2006). Interestingly, activity in the posterior 
cingulate cortex and precuneus has been implicated in the self-distancing from neutral and 
negative pictures of social situations (i.e. as they were viewing the scene objectively) to 
down-regulate emotions (Koenigsberg et al., 2010). This was explained by the posterior 
cingulate cortex and precuneus being implicated in processes important for assuming a 
distanced perspective, such as being unengaged in witnessed social interactions and assessing 
the self-relevance of stimuli (Koeningsberg et al., 2010). Indeed, studies have associated the 
posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus with self-referential/-evaluative processing (for 
review, see Northoff et al., 2006). However, a recent review proposes the posterior cingulate 
cortex and precuneus to be part of a network involved in evaluative processes enabling 
identification, attribution, and reflection upon a subject, but not specifically for self or others 
(Legrand & Ruby, 2009). It is proposed that the posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus are 
crucial areas in this evaluation network in providing information from memory for evaluative 
processes (Legrand & Ruby, 2009). These findings fit the idea that observer perspective 
imagery is related to thinking about the recalled event in terms of its broader meaning in an 
individuals’ life, with the meaning of such events in relation to the self-concept becoming 
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more salient (Libby & Eibach, 2011), or evaluative thinking about the self (Kuyken & 
Howell, 2006; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). 
 Finally, as behavioral research relates field perspective imagery to a greater emotional 
response than observer perspective imagery (e.g. Holmes et al., 2008; McIsaac & Eich, 2002), 
differences between imagery perspectives could be larger for emotional memories because 
more variance in the emotional response is possible. As neutral memories are expected to 
evoke no, or just a small emotional response, differences between imagery perspectives with 
regard to the emotional response might be smaller, also at the neurobiological level. 
Therefore, we examined whether differences in neural activity between imagery perspectives 
was different for neutral and positive emotional memories, by investigating the interaction 
with adopted imagery perspective and memory valence. We hypothesized that differential 
activity between field- versus observer perspective imagery in areas related to subjective 
emotionality and interoceptive awareness of one’s feelings (i.e. amygdala, insula, and 
somatosensory areas) would be larger for emotional, positive memories than for neutral 
memories.    
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Thirty-four healthy, right-handed females, aged between 18 and 31 (M = 22.71, SD = 
2.71), participated in this study and received €40 for their participation. A ‘uniform’ group of 
right-handed female subjects was selected because of sex-related influences on neural 
mechanisms underlying emotion processing (e.g. Cahill, 2003; Van Strien & Van Beek, 
2000). This study was approved by the medical ethical committee of the University Hospital 
at Ghent University. 
2.2 Material 
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2.2.1 Screening. Current and lifetime history of psychiatric disorders based on DSM-
IV and ICD-10 criteria was assessed using the Dutch version of the structured Mini 
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). 
Safety criteria for participation in an experiment using an MR-scanner were checked 
through a pre-scanning safety checklist developed by the Ghent Institute for Functional and 
Metabolic Imaging. This checklist is based on guidelines from the Institute for Magnetic 
Resonance Safety, Education and Research and the International Commission on Non-
Ionizing Radiation Protection. 
2.2.2 Questionnaires. Throughout the fMRI paradigm in the scanner we measured 
mood state and adopted imagery perspective using 9-point Likert scales. We measured how 
happy and sad participants were feeling “at the moment”  on a 9-point scale from 1 “neutral” 
to 5 “moderate” to “as happy/sad as I can imagine.” Furthermore, participants were asked to 
rate to what extent they “…saw the event through your own eyes, like you were actively 
involved?” (i.e. field perspective) and “to what extent did you experience the event looking at 
yourself from outside, as if you see yourself taking part in the situation?” (i.e. observer 
perspective) on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 5 “somewhat” to 9 “very much.”   
A post-scanning checklist was administered at the end of the scanning session 
assessing whether the participant had experienced any symptoms as a result of time-varying 
magnetic fields. This checklist is based on guidelines from the Institute for Magnetic 
Resonance Safety, Education and Research and the International Commission on Non-
Ionizing Radiation Protection. 
2.2.3 fMRI paradigm. For the task in the scanner, participants were asked to provide 
four memories of specific events that happened more than one week ago. Participants were 
asked to recall two situations that did not elicit strong negative or positive emotions at that 
time (i.e. two neutral memories) and two situations which made them feel very happy at that 
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time (i.e. two positive memories). Cue words were connected to each of the four situations, so 
that these could be used for instructions during the task in the scanner to indicate which of the 
situations had to be recalled and imagined. Participants then received an explanation of the 
differences between field perspective imagery (“as if you are there, seeing the situation 
through your own eyes”) and observer perspective imagery (“as if you are there, seeing what 
is happening looking at yourself from the outside, watching yourself taking part in the 
situation”). Furthermore, participants completed two similar imagery practice tasks of cutting 
a lemon, once receiving instructions on adopting a field perspective and once receiving 
instructions on adopting an observer perspective (based on Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 
2008). 
 
Figure 1. Each block (A) consisted of an alternation of the mental imagery task (B) and visual 
search task (D). The imagery task started with instructions on memory type and imagery 
perspective, depicted by icons (C). All participants were familiarized with these icons and 
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how they related to the different conditions prior to entering the scanner. The memory being 
recalled and the imagery perspective remained constant during the entire block. 
 
The actual fMRI paradigm consisted of eight blocks (see Figure 1A) and was designed 
in such a way that hemodynamic activity during imagery of autobiographical memories was 
contrasted to hemodynamic activity during a control task, that is, a visual search task (based 
on the design of Eich et al., 2009). Different experimental conditions in the paradigm were 
based on valence of memory (positive vs. neutral memory) and imagery perspective (field vs. 
observer perspective), resulting in four experimental conditions: positive-field, neutral-field, 
positive-observer, and neutral-observer. The memory being recalled and the imagery 
perspective remained constant during an entire block. Participants were asked to recall two 
different positive and neutral situations, which were each recalled from both a field- and 
observer perspective. Thus, each experimental condition/block occurred twice, resulting in 
eight blocks divided over two functional runs consisting of four blocks each. There were two 
versions of the fMRI paradigm, counterbalancing the starting imagery perspective across 
participants, while each participant started with imagery of a positive memory which was then 
followed by a block imagining a neutral memory. That is, the order of blocks (i.e. 
experimental conditions) in one functional run was either: positive-field, neutral-field, 
positive-observer, and neutral-observer, or positive-observer, neutral-observer, positive-field, 
and neutral-field. Block order in the two functional runs was identical within one participant, 
but a different positive and neutral situation was recalled across the two functional runs. 
Each block (see Figure 1A) consisted of an alternation of the mental imagery task and 
a visual search task. The visual search task was used as an active control task in order to avoid 
that increases in BOLD-signal during the mental imagery task could be attributed to a general 
increase in cognitive activity rather than memory retrieval itself (Eich et al., 2009). The block 
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began with auditory instructions given by the experimenter on which specific memory was to 
be imagined and from which imagery perspective. Halfway and at the end of each block 
participants were asked to rate verbally, using the four Likert scales, how happy and sad they 
were feeling at the time and to what extent they had imagined the memory from a field 
perspective and observer perspective. Before the second administration of the Likert scales at 
the end of the block, there was a short break with a duration randomized between 5000 and 
15000msec in steps of 500msec. 
2.2.3.1 Imagery task. The imagery task (see Figure 1B) started with a screen presented 
for 4sec repeating the block instructions depicted by icons (see Figure 1C). These icons 
indicated whether a positive or neutral memory was to be recalled (the specific situation had 
been described in the auditory instructions at the beginning of the block) and from which 
imagery perspective. This screen was followed by a black screen presented for 25sec during 
which participants closed their eyes and silently imagined the recalled situation. At the end of 
the 25sec a beep sound was played to indicate the end of the imagery task and participants had 
to open their eyes. 
2.2.3.2 Visual search task. The visual search task (see Figure 1D) was identical to that 
used by Eich and colleagues (2009). The task started with the 2-sec presentation of a single 
letter or number of a particular color, which was the target for the visual search (both letter 
and color need to match). This was followed by a 2-sec blank screen after which the search 
display was presented for 14sec. After the search display again a 2-sec blank screen was 
presented followed by a suggestion of the number of displayed targets for 2sec. Participants 
then indicated whether this was the number of targets they had found in the search display by 
saying “correct” or “incorrect” for which they had 2sec. Across all visual search displays in 
the paradigm, the actual number of targets matched the suggested number of targets in only 
50% of the time.    
IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE AND MEMORY RECALL  14 
 
 
 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were recruited through an experiment website where people can 
voluntarily sign up for participation in psychology experiments. The first inclusion criteria 
such as gender and right-handedness were checked through questions on the website before 
people could actually register for the experiment. Information about the study on the website 
informed participants that only after additional screening, registration could be confirmed. 
After registration, participants were contacted by email and invited for a screening 
appointment. During this first screening appointment, inclusion criteria (no history of 
psychiatric disorders and meeting the safety criteria for participating in an MRI experiment) 
were further checked with the Dutch version of the MINI to explore a history of axis-I 
disorders and a pre-scanning safety checklist to make sure participants met the safety criteria 
for using the MRI system. When the inclusion criteria were met, participation in the fMRI 
experiment was confirmed. Further detailed information on the study was provided on paper. 
Participants were asked to read the information and were given the opportunity to ask further 
questions to the experimenter before signing the informed consent form.  
During the actual testing appointment participants were first asked to provide two 
neutral and two positive memories of specific events that happened more than one week ago. 
After completing two practice tasks, one to practice field perspective imagery and one to 
practice observer perspective imagery, participants were explained how the fMRI paradigm 
would look like in the scanner. They received instructions on how to rate the Likert scales and 
were explained the procedure of the mental imagery task and visual search task. Participants 
were then prepared to enter the MRI scanner. Each scanning session started with an 
anatomical scan which lasted about 5 minutes, followed by the fMRI paradigm divided in two 
functional runs with a short break in between. After finishing the task in the scanner, the 
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participant was asked to fill out the post-scan checklist. Finally, participants were fully 
debriefed about the experiment. 
2.4 fMRI Data Acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a Siemens Trio Tim 3T MRI scanner (Siemens Medical 
Systems, Erlangen, Germany), using a 32-channel head coil. After automatic shimming of the 
magnetic field on each participant, T1-weighted 3D high resolution MPRAGE images were 
acquired of the whole brain in the sagittal plane (176 slices, TR = 2550 ms, TE = 4.18 msec, 
TI = 900 msec, acquisition matrix = 256 × 256, FoV = 256 mm, flip angle = 9°, voxel 
size = 1 × 1 × 1mm). These anatomical images were used for coregistration with the 
functional images and normalization. During the fMRI paradigm, functional echo-planar 
images (EPIs) in the axial plane were acquired (34 interleaved slices, TR = 2000msec, TE = 
28msec, acquisition matrix = 64 × 64, FoV = 224 mm, flip angle = 80°, voxel 
size = 3.5 × 3.5 × 3mm, slice thickness = 3mm, inter-slice gap = 0.5mm). 
2.5 Image Analysis 
Data analysis was performed using BrainVoyager QX (Goebel et al., 2006). Each 
participants’ 3D anatomical data was normalized into Talairach standard space in two steps. 
The first step consisted of translating and rotating the cerebrum into the AC-PC plane (AC = 
anterior commissure, PC = posterior commissure). In the second step, the borders of the 
cerebrum were identified and in addition with the AC and PC point, the size of the brain was 
fitted into Talairach standard space using sinc interpolation. For the functional data of each 
participant, a standard sequence of preprocessing steps was performed. Slice scan time 
correction was performed by means of sinc interpolation, 3D motion correction by spatial 
alignment to the first volume was performed by means of sinc interpolation, and temporal 
filtering was performed using linear trend removal and high pass filtering for low-frequency 
drifts of two or fewer cycles. Spatial smoothing using a Gaussian filter (FWHM = 6mm) was 
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applied for the volume-based analysis. The functional data for each participant was then 
coregistered with the participants’ 3D anatomical data and transformed into Talairach 
standard space.  
For each subject, a protocol file was created representing the onset and duration of 
each 25sec imagery period of the mental imagery task for the four different experimental 
conditions and the onset and duration of each 14sec search display of the visual search task 
for the control condition. Factorial designs were automatically defined from the created 
stimulus protocols. Additionally, 6 motion predictors (3 translation, 3 rotation parameters) 
were added as confounds to the single-subject General Linear Model. The blood-oxygen-level 
dependent (BOLD) response in each condition was then modeled by convolving the neural 
functions with a canonical hemodynamic response function (two gamma HRF) to form 
covariates in a General Linear Model.  
After the General Linear Models (GLM) had been fitted, group (random effects 
procedure) t-maps were generated to evaluate the effects of imagining memories from 
different perspectives, for which a brain tissue mask was applied. First, we determined voxel 
clusters showing significant increases in the BOLD response for each of the four experimental 
conditions separately, contrasting the effects of imagery of autobiographical memories from a 
certain perspective to the control condition (visual search): positive-field>visual search, 
neutral-field>visual search, positive-observer>visual search, and neutral-observer>visual 
search. In a second step, we directly contrasted adopting a field perspective versus an 
observer perspective collapsed over positive and neutral autobiographical memories: positive-
field + neutral-field>positive-observer + neutral-observer and positive-observer + neutral-
observer>positive-field + neutral-field. Finally we tested the interaction between Perspective 
(field vs. observer) and memory Valence (neutral vs. positive) with a factorial ANOVA, to 
investigate whether differential activity between imagery perspectives was different 
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depending on the valence of the memory. The basic contrasts comparing experimental 
conditions to the control task were adequately described with a threshold of p < .05 corrected 
for multiple comparisons using False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction (Genovese et al., 
2002). However, for the contrasts directly comparing field perspective to observer perspective 
this threshold required adjustment to describe subtle differences, but this is explicitly 
mentioned in the text and figure. Areas that showed significant activation were identified 
using the brain atlases of Mai, Paxinos, and Voss (2008), and Talairach and Tournoux (1988). 
Areas in the cerebellum that showed significant activation were identified using the Talairach 
deamon (Lancaster, et al., 1997; Lancaster et al., 2000). 
For our main research question of interest (i.e. directly contrasting the visual 
perspectives) we calculated time courses for the clusters that survived threshold, by means of 
event-related averaging. The mean time course for conditions was obtained by averaging all 
peri-stimulus time course segments belonging to the same condition (i.e. the 25 sec. imagery 
block, separately per condition). The baseline to calculate the percent signal change was set to 
24 seconds before the 25 sec. imagery block, thus including the visual search control task, and 
was computed in a file-based manner. That is, the baseline values of each epoch were first 
averaged and then used to calculate the percent signal change.   
3. Results 
3.1 Preliminary analyses 
Seven participants were excluded from further analyses, based on results from 3D 
motion correction during preprocessing (n = 6), and due to technical issues during data 
acquisition (n = 1). The remaining sample consisted of 27 right-handed women, aged between 
18 and 31 years (M = 22.41, SD = 2.81). 
3.2 Behavioral data 
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3.2.1 Imagery perspective manipulation check. To investigate differences between 
the four experimental conditions in the extent to which participants adopted a field and 
observer perspective, a repeated measures ANOVA with within-subject factors Valence 
(positive memory, neutral memory) and Perspective (field, observer) was performed on the 
data from the Likert scales.  
The repeated measures ANOVA on ratings of adopting a field perspective yielded a 
significant main effect of Valence, F(1,26) = 7.43, p = .011, ηp² = .22, and a main effect of 
Perspective, F(1,26) = 331.93, p < .001, ηp² = .93. These results indicated that participants 
generally reported to adopt a field perspective more when imagining positive memories (M = 
5.19, SD = 0.53) than when imagining neutral memories (M = 4.93, SD = 0.68), regardless of 
instructions on imagery perspective. Furthermore, across both positive and neutral memories 
participants reported to adopt a field perspective more when instructions were to imagine the 
situation from a field perspective (M = 7.43, SD = 0.74) as compared to an observer 
perspective (M = 2.69, SD = 1.00). 
 The repeated measures ANOVA on ratings of adopting an observer perspective 
yielded a significant main effect of Perspective, F(1,26) = 427.95, p < .001, ηp² = .94. This 
indicated that as expected, across both positive and neutral memories participants reported to 
adopt an observer perspective more when instructions were to imagine the situation from an 
observer perspective (M = 7.20, SD = 0.90) as compared to a field perspective (M = 2.10, SD 
= 0.67)1. 
3.2.2 Memory remoteness and imagery perspective. Previous research has shown 
that memory remoteness can influence imagery perspective (Rice & Rubin, 2009). Recent 
memories are more likely viewed from a field perspective while more remote memories are 
more likely viewed from an observer perspective. Although we manipulated imagery 
                                                 
1 Adding block order (i.e. starting with field perspective imagery or observer perspective imagery) as a between-
subjects factor did not change the results of the manipulation check on imagery perspective. 
IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE AND MEMORY RECALL  19 
 
 
 
perspective in the current experiment, we tested whether memory remoteness influenced the 
extent to which participants adopted a field and observer perspective when imagining each 
specific memory. We analyzed the effect of memory remoteness with non-parametric 
Kruskall-Wallis tests (due to non-normality of the data). Memory remoteness was entered as 
independent variable (coded as 1 = 1-2 weeks; 2 = 2 weeks - 6 months; 3 = > 6 months) and 
data from the Likert scales as dependent variable (4 separate tests: Likert field when block 
instructions are field; Likert observator when block instructions are field; Likert field when 
block instructions are observer; Likert observator when block instructions are observer) for 
each memory (4 separate tests per Likert scale (positive memory 1; positive memory 2; 
neutral memory 1; neutral memory 2). This results in sixteen separate tests. These analyses 
showed that Memory remoteness had a significant effect on ratings of field perspective during 
blocks in which the instructions were to adopt a field perspective for positive memory 1,  H(2) 
= 6.10, p = .047. Additionally, for positive memory 2, remoteness had a significant effect on 
ratings of observer perspective imagery during blocks in which the instructions were to adopt 
a field perspective, H(2) = 4.70, p = .027, and ratings of field perspective imagery during 
blocks in which the instructions were to adopt an observer perspective, H(2) = 4.16, p = .041. 
However, when correcting for multiple testing to avoid type-I error inflation (i.e. α / 16 = 
0.0031), no significant effects were observed of memory remoteness on the extent to which 
participants adopted a field and observer perspective during imagery.  
3.2.3 Effects of perspective manipulation on mood. Throughout the task in the 
scanner, participants were also asked to rate how happy and sad they were feeling at that 
moment. Due to non-normality of the data, we performed non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank tests. We tested our main predictions on the differences in happy and sad mood between 
the field perspective condition and observer perspective condition when participants imagined 
either positive or neutral memories. There were no significant differences in ratings of 
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sadness between field perspective imagery and observer perspective imagery when imagining 
positive, T = 23.00, p = .730, r = -.06, or neutral memories, T = 13.00, p = .079, r = -.25. 
Neither was there a difference in ratings of happiness between field perspective imagery and 
observer perspective imagery when imagining neutral memories, T = 129.00, p = .565, r = -
.08. However, there was a significant difference in ratings of happiness between field 
perspective imagery and observer perspective imagery when imagining positive memories, T 
= 70.00, p = .020, r = -.31, indicating that feelings of happiness were higher when imagining 
positive memories from a field perspective (M = 6.70, SD = 0.92), than from an observer 
perspective (M = 6.40, SD = 1.05). 
 
 
Figure 2. A. Contrast for positive memories imagined from a field perspective versus the 
control visual search task. B. Contrast for neutral memories imagined from a field 
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perspective versus the control visual search task. C. Contrast for positive memories imagined 
from an observer perspective versus the control visual search task. D. Contrast for neutral 
memories imagined from an observer perspective versus the control visual search task. 
Activation maps are at (FDR) p < .05. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere.   
 
3.3 Imaging data 
3.3.1 Experimental conditions versus control task. In a first step we identified the 
regions that showed significant increases in BOLD-signal during recall of positive and neutral 
memories from a field and observer perspective (see Figure 2A-D). Across the four 
experimental conditions compared to the control task we observed significant activity in 
mostly similar areas. Across experimental conditions, when contrasted to the control task, 
areas of increased BOLD activity included dorsolateral, dorsomedial, ventrolateral, 
ventromedial and orbital parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) bilaterally although more 
extensive in the left hemisphere, middle/superior temporal gyrus extending to the angular 
gyrus bilaterally, hippocampus bilaterally, and precuneus (extending to cingulate cortex). A 
full overview of the clusters that showed significant activity can be found in Supplemental 
Material (Supplemental table 1-4 in S1) available online.   
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Figure 3. Observer perspective, when contrasted to field perspective, was associated with 
greater activation in A. the right precuneus (peak activation at x = 5, y = -62, z = 45) and in 
B. an area at the junction of the right angular gyrus and superior/middle temporal gyrus 
(peak activation at x = 32, y = –62, z = 21). Statistics were based on a threshold of p < .001 
uncorrected with a minimum cluster size of k ≥ 300 contiguous voxels (voxel size 1x1x1mm). 
Time courses for these clusters are depicted.  
 
3.3.2 Field versus observer perspective. In a next step we directly compared 
adopting a field perspective versus an observer perspective collapsed over positive and neutral 
autobiographical memories. As we anticipated this to reflect subtle differences we adjusted 
the threshold to t > 3.771 , p < .001 (uncorrected), and used a minimum cluster size of (k ≥ 
300 contiguous voxels with voxel size 1x1x1mm).  
No regions showed a significant greater BOLD-response during a field perspective as 
contrasted to adopting an observer perspective ((positive-field + neutral-field)>(positive-
observer + neutral-observer)). For explorative purposes we calculated the time courses for the 
four imagery conditions for the amygdala, insula, precentral gyrus (motor cortex), and 
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postcentral gyrus (sensory cortex), using anatomical ROIs (masks) based on the Talairach 
coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). These can be found in Supplemental Material 
(Supplemental figures 1-4 in S1) available online. On the other hand, during an observer 
perspective, when directly contrasted to a field perspective ((positive-observer + neutral-
observer)>(positive-field + neutral-field); see Figure 3), we observed a greater response in the 
right precuneus (x = 5, y = –62, z = 45; t-value: 4.30; p < 0.001 uncorr.) and in an area at the 
junction of the right angular gyrus and superior/middle temporal gyrus (x = 32, y = –62, z = 
21; t-value: 4.65; p < 0.001 uncorr.). These clusters had BOLD responses that were 
significantly more negative during field perspective as compared to observer perspective, 
relative to the baseline visual search control task (see Figure 3).2 
3.3.3 Interaction imagery perspective with memory valence. A two-factor ANOVA 
was specified in order to test the interaction between imagery perspective and memory 
valence. The model consisted of two within-subject factors, Perspective (field vs. observer) 
and memory Valence (neutral vs. positive). We performed an F test for the Perspective x 
Valence interaction, using a threshold of (FDR) F(1,26) > 17.12, p < .05. However, no 
significant activity was observed, neither when adjusting the threshold to F(1,26) > 13.74, p < 
.001 uncorrected with a minimum cluster size of (k ≥ 300 contiguous voxels with voxel size 
1x1x1mm), to allow for investigation of more subtle differences. 
4. Discussion 
The present study was designed to examine differences in neural areas mediating 
autobiographical memory recall from a field perspective and observer perspective. Imagery 
perspective has shown to influence what is recalled (McIsaac & Eich, 2002), processing style 
                                                 
2 We also hypothesized differential activity for field and observer perspective in the amygdala. As activation in 
these structures are commonly in a small voxel range, we performed a ROI-analysis using a mask of the left and 
right amygdala according to the Talairach coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). However, no significant 
activation was observed during the field > observer and observer > field contrasts, neither when testing the 
interaction between imagery perspective and memory valence in a factorial ANOVA. 
IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE AND MEMORY RECALL  24 
 
 
 
(Libby & Eibach, 2011), and emotionality (Holmes et al., 2008). However, our understanding 
of possible mechanisms mediating these observed differences is still limited. By investigating 
what is underlying differences between field- and observer perspective imagery at the 
neurobiological level, we aimed to complement behavioral research and thereby improve our 
understanding of how imagery perspective can influence what is recalled, processing style, 
and emotionality. Therefore, we conducted a fMRI study comparing field perspective imagery 
to observer perspective imagery when imagining neutral and positive autobiographical 
memories.  
First, behavioral data confirmed that our manipulation of imagery perspective had 
worked. Across both neutral and positive memories, participants adopted a field perspective 
more when instructions were to imagine the event from a field perspective, while participants 
adopted an observer perspective more when instructions were to imagine the event from an 
observer perspective. Furthermore, participants reported to adopt a field perspective more 
when they were imagining positive emotional memories as compared to neutral memories, 
regardless of perspective instructions. This could be explained by previous research 
suggesting that a field perspective is (automatically) adopted when a memory is more 
congruent with the current self-concept, while observer perspective is more adopted in the 
case of inconsistency with currently activated self-views (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Wilson & 
Ross, 2003). Healthy individuals often consider positive memories more in line with a current 
self, so positive memories are often recalled from a field perspective (Libby & Eibach, 2002; 
Wilson & Ross, 2003), while (sub-clinical) depressed individuals have a tendency to recall 
positive memories from an observer perspective (Lemogne et al., 2006; Nelis et al., 2013). 
The behavioral results on the emotional response to imagery showed that there were 
no differences between imagery perspectives in the positive emotional response for neutral 
memories, probably due to the non-emotional nature of the memories. However, when 
IMAGERY PERSPECTIVE AND MEMORY RECALL  25 
 
 
 
imagining positive autobiographical memories, feelings of happiness were slightly, but 
significantly higher when adopting a field perspective, than when adopting an observer 
perspective. This is consistent with previous research showing a reduced emotional response 
during observer perspective imagery (Holmes et al., 2008). No differences were found for 
feelings of sadness between the two imagery perspectives, likely due to our focus on 
memories evoking neutral or more positive feelings.  
Results from our imaging data showed that across all experimental conditions, when 
contrasted to the control task, areas of increased activity included dorsolateral, dorsomedial, 
ventrolateral, ventromedial and orbital parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) bilaterally 
although more extensive in the left hemisphere. Additionally we observed activity in the 
middle and superior temporal gyrus extending to the angular gyrus bilaterally, the 
hippocampus bilaterally, and the precuneus. This is in line with previous findings on 
autobiographical memory recall (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Eich et al., 2009; Svoboda et 
al., 2006) and shows this network is engaged regardless of imagery perspective. Interestingly, 
most of these areas are also part of the emotion regulation circuitry (Davidson et al., 2002), 
suggesting that in healthy individuals similar brain networks are implicated in the re-
activation of neutral and positive autobiographical memories and the regulation of emotions 
by prefrontal areas. 
When directly contrasting field perspective imagery to observer perspective imagery, 
no regions showed increased activity during field perspective imagery and this did not interact 
with memory valence (neutral, positive). This is inconsistent with our predictions and 
previous research showing a field perspective, when directly compared to an observer 
perspective, to be associated with more activity in the amygdala, insula and somato-motor 
areas (Eich et al., 2009). Although it remains unclear exactly why our results did not confirm 
previous findings, one possible explanation could be related to the age of the memory. 
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Previous research has indicated that remote memories, as compared to recent memories, were 
associated with more observer perspective and less field perspective, and this effect was 
explained by a loss of visual and sensory details for more remote memories (Rice & Rubin, 
2009). Whereas Eich et al. (2009) used memories of physically engaging tasks performed the 
week before, the autobiographical events in the current study had occurred at least one week 
before, with the result that participants recalled memories with more spread in memory 
remoteness as compared to the study of Eich et al. (2009). Thus, even though we manipulated 
imagery perspective, and analyses on the influence of memory remoteness on the extent to 
which participants adopted a field and observer perspective during imagery revealed no 
significant influence of memory remoteness, this may have had an influence on the visual and 
sensory details available in memory. This may thereby have attenuated differences between 
field perspective and observer perspective in the degree of (physically) reliving the situation 
or interoceptive awareness of feelings and affective monitoring (related to the insula, somato-
motor areas, and amygdala). A second possible explanation is that less sensory details were 
available for the memories because such sensory aspects might have been less central for the 
autobiographical events recalled in the current study, as compared to the recalled (physical) 
tasks in the study of Eich et al. (2009). Similarly, previous studies on perspective taking when 
viewing externally generated images involved physical actions in which sensory aspects play 
a central role (e.g. Jackson et al., 2006). As the meaning of the self-generated 
autobiographical memories in the current study might have been more inclined towards 
broader implications in one’s life, sensory details may have not been maintained as well in 
memory, even if memory age was similar. 
During observer perspective imagery, when contrasted to field perspective imagery, 
we observed differences between visual perspectives. Greater activity was observed, or less 
decreased activity relative to the control task, in the right precuneus and an area at the 
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junction of the right angular gyrus and superior/middle temporal gyrus, often described as the 
right temporoparietal junction (TPJ). No regions showed significant activity for the 
interaction between perspective and memory valence (neutral, positive), suggesting that the 
underlying neurobiological differences between observer perspective and field perspective are 
not different for neutral and (positive) emotional memories.  
Based on previous literature examining differences between visual perspectives, we 
did not hypothesize to observe greater right TPJ activity during observer as compared to field 
perspective imagery. The right TPJ has been linked to both attention processes and social 
cognition (Krall et al., 2015). It is believed that the underlying commonality between these 
seemingly different cognitive processes is attentional shifting, given that right TPJ 
involvement is often found in attention reorienting tasks and theory of mind related paradigms 
that require performing a shift in mental state (Krall et al., 2015). One explanation for that 
observer perspective as compared to field perspective imagery involved greater right TPJ 
activity, or less decreased activity relative to the visual search control task, is that imagining 
yourself in a situation from a distance (observer) requires a greater shift of perspective in 
mental state than imagining a situation through your own eyes (field). Interestingly, the right 
TPJ has also been involved in coding embodiment and out-of-body experiences (e.g. Arzy, 
Thut, Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2006; Blanke et al., 2005). Experimental studies have used an 
own-body-transformation (OBT) task in which participants are asked to imagine themselves 
in the body position of a human figure on a screen and then make left-right judgments 
adopting the figure’s visuospatial perspective (Arzy et al., 2006; Blanke et al., 2005). Such an 
OBT task requires participants to perform own-body imagery with a disembodied self-
location, and thus also involves a shift to a more self-distanced perspective. The observed 
differential activity in the right TPJ area during observer versus field perspective imagery may 
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thus reflect differences in the extent to which a shift in perspective or mental state is 
performed while adopting the specific imagery perspective.  
Our results on differential activity in the precuneus are in line with research comparing 
third-person perspective to first-person perspective when imagining motor action (Ruby & 
Decety, 2001), observing social interaction as compared to being personally involved in the 
social interaction (Schilbach et al., 2006), and during self-distancing from neutral and 
negative pictures of social situations (Koeningsberg et al. 2010). Previous research has 
explained these findings with the role of the precuneus in processes important for assuming a 
distanced perspective (Koeningsberg et al., 2010) and self-representation (Ruby & Decety, 
2001), also with regard to the spatial reference of oneself relative to others (Schilbach et al., 
2006). This reflects that during observer perspective imagery, people adopt a more self-
distanced perspective than during field perspective imagery. Many studies have also linked 
the precuneus to self-referential/self-evaluative processes (for review, see Northoff et al., 
2006) or as part of a network involved in evaluative processing more generally (Legrand & 
Ruby, 2009). This is interesting as it has previously been suggested that self-evaluative 
processing is more likely to occur during observer perspective imagery than during field 
perspective imagery, which could mediate differences in the emotional response (Kuyken & 
Howell, 2006; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). Our finding that relative to the control task, activity 
in the precuneus decreased more during field perspective imagery than during observer 
perspective imagery, could therefore support this idea that field perspective imagery is less 
likely to evoke (self-) evaluative processing. Imagery perspective might thus not directly 
influence the emotional response, but this may depend on whether evaluative consideration of 
the event in relation to the self-concept – more likely occurring during an observer 
perspective - decreases or increases emotional power (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Our findings of 
both differential activity in the precuneus depending on imagery perspective and the absence 
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(i.e. not ‘surviving’ the threshold) of differential activity in areas like the amygdala, seem to 
correspond with this latter idea.  
In light of this idea, a possible explanation for why previous research on the 
neurobiological differences between imagery perspectives during memory recall (Eich et al., 
2009) did not find any differential activation in the precuneus during observer as compared to 
field perspective might be related to characteristics of the memories that were recalled. 
Imagery of real autobiographical events might be necessary to capture the process of 
evaluative consideration of specific events, and the likelihood of such evaluative processing 
occurring may thus differ depending on imagery perspective. However, memories of 
performed (physical) tasks (see Eich et al., 2009) may have only limited potential for broader 
meaning and thus may not provide material to sustain such evaluative thinking. If emotional 
intensity in response to memory recall depends on how the event is evaluated, with such (self-
) evaluative processing more likely occurring during observer perspective imagery, individual 
differences in general/current self-beliefs can lead to different meanings of events and thereby 
influence the evoked emotional response (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Provided that depression is 
associated with more negative self-evaluation and self-schema (Clark et al., 1999), this 
increases the likelihood that the meaning of a past positive event in relation to the (current 
negative) self-concept results in unfavorable evaluation, dampening the positive emotional 
response during observer perspective imagery. Interestingly, behavioral studies investigating 
the role of imagery perspective in relation to depression, reveal that depression is related with 
a tendency to objectify the self (as falling short). This tendency is suggested to prime observer 
memories in which the objectified self can be evaluated, which is likely to lead to unfavorable 
self-evaluations (Kuyken & Howell, 2006). However, future research should first aim to 
replicate these findings in (sub-clinically) depressed individuals, to clarify whether 
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differences between imagery perspectives at the neurobiological level are not by itself 
influenced by the presence of depressive symptoms. 
The precuneus, also part of the default mode network, has shown to play a role in a 
range of higher-order cognitive functions, amongst others self-evaluative processing, but also 
visuospatial imagery (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Therefore, an alternative interpretation for 
increased precuneus activity during observer perspective as compared to field perspective 
imagery (or less decrease in activity relative to the visual search control task) could be based 
on its role in spatial processing. In the context of spatial processing a distinction has been 
made between egocentric frame of reference, defined as subject-to-object relations, and 
allocentric frame of reference, defined as object-to-object relations (e.g. Zaehle et al., 2007). 
In an egocentric framework locations are represented in relation to “a personal agent and his 
physical configuration” (Vogeley & Fink, 2003, p. 39), while an allocentric framework is 
“independent from the agent’s position” (Vogeley & Fink, 2003, p.39). Research on the role 
of the precuneus in egocentric and allocentric spatial processing has produced mixed results 
showing involvement of the precuneus during allocentric spatial representation (e.g. Zhang & 
Ekstrom, 2013), but also during both egocentric and allocentric spatial processing although 
stronger during egocentric spatial coding (Zaehle et al., 2007). Both ‘forms’ of spatial 
processing have thus been related to activity in the precuneus. Importantly, the distinction 
between egocentric and allocentric reference frames should be separated from the distinction 
between field and observer perspective (Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Both field and observer 
perspective imagery are centered on the body of an agent, but an observer perspective requires 
a translocation of the egocentric perspective (Vogeley & Fink, 2003; David et al., 2006). 
However, given the role of the precuneus in visuospatial processing, this could suggest that 
taking an observer perspective when imagining an autobiographical event is associated with 
more elaboration on spatial relations than when adopting a field perspective. Thus while there 
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may be less activity within the precuneus during memory recall, relative to the visual search 
control task, adopting an observer perspective retains greater involvement of the precuneus 
than during a field perspective. This is in line with behavioral findings showing that memories 
imagined from an observer perspective include more information about visuospatial relations 
(McIsaac & Eich, 2002). We cannot exclude that differential activity in the precuneus during 
imagery perspectives reflects both differences in self-referential/self-evaluative processing 
and visuospatial processing. These can reflect different and possibly parallel mechanisms 
through which imagery perspective has an influence on the type of information that is recalled 
and the intensity of the emotional response.   
There are several limitations to this study that are worth mentioning. First is the lack 
of control over the content of the memories. However, the difference in content of memory 
across individuals could also be seen as an advantage as observed activity in the brain is less 
likely to be related to content aspects of the recalled memories instead of the mechanisms 
underlying imagery of autobiographical memory. Moreover, an event that is perceived to be 
positive or neutral for one person might not necessarily be perceived in the same way for 
another person. Therefore, in the current study participants decided themselves on past events 
that they perceived as neutral and positive. Secondly, we did not control for memory 
remoteness, apart from that the event had to have taken place a minimum of one week ago. 
Previous research has shown that memory remoteness is related to imagery perspective (Rice 
& Rubin, 2009). However, in the current study we gave explicit instructions on imagery 
perspective, which limits the confounding influence of differences in memory remoteness. 
Furthermore, analyses on the influence of memory remoteness on the extent to which 
participants adopted a field and observer perspective during imagery revealed no significant 
influence of memory remoteness (after correcting for multiple testing). Nonetheless, memory 
remoteness may have had an influence on the visual and sensory details available in memory. 
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Therefore, it would be good for future research to limit memory age. Third, although in 
designing the study we sought to find a balance between sufficient power and not increasing 
the total scan time too much -in order to avoid tiredness in the participants which could 
influence the results- the scan time per condition might have limited the power to detect 
interactions of imagery perspective and emotional valence. A final limitation is that the 
interpretation of the results is limited to young, healthy females and cannot be generalized to a 
broader population. 
In conclusion, the behavioral results of our study showed that different ways of 
imagining positive autobiographical memories, from a field perspective or an observer 
perspective, can influence the emotional response to imagery. At the neurobiological level, an 
observer perspective, when directly compared to a field perspective, was associated with 
greater activity, that is, less decrease relative to the visual search control task, in the right TPJ 
and right precuneus. Relative greater activity in the right TPJ could reflect the necessity for a 
greater shift of perspective and mental state during observer perspective imagery than field 
perspective imagery. Differential activity in the precuneus seems to reflect that during 
observer perspective imagery as compared to field perspective imagery, individuals are more 
likely to engage in both (self-) evaluative processing and visuospatial processing, in line with 
previous behavioral research. Through different or possibly parallel mechanisms this could 
influence the type of information that is recalled and the emotional response. Given the 
potential role mental imagery can play in psychotherapy, it will be important for future 
research to further investigate differences between imagery perspectives and how this may 
influence the likelihood of evaluative processing to occur during memory recall. That would 
further strengthen the idea based on behavioral findings, that adopting an observer perspective 
influences emotional intensity (increasing/decreasing) depending on how the imagined 
situation is perceived or evaluated in relation to the self-concept (Libby & Eibach, 2011). As a 
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consequence though, individual differences in self-beliefs could qualify the perceived 
meanings of events, and thereby influence the emotional response (Libby & Eibach, 2011) 
and make observer perspective imagery possibly less adaptive in terms of emotion regulation 
or for the self-generation of positive emotions.  
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